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ABSTRACT
The job of the police is to stop crime by stopping criminals. It is a
real life, deadly cat-and-mouse game where the hunter and the hunted
spar for advantage and success. To accomplish its goals, law
enforcement can draw from a vast array of technologies, stratagems,
and devices. One of the primary weapons in the law enforcement
arsenal is deceit. Criminals, like most prey, are lured into clever traps
set by police. The police create circumstances and situations that are
designed to prompt the criminal suspect into revealing incriminating
information. This is obvious in the use of confidential informants,
undercover police officers, and other common police tactics. Suspects
are “tricked” by police into revealing themselves. A controversial
aspect of this kind of police “trickery” occurs in the interrogation
context. What may police tell suspects to “trick” or prompt them into
* Associate Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law. I want to thank the following
persons and colleagues for their willingness to comment on this article: John Yoo
(U.C. Berkeley); Joseph P. Buckley (President, John E. Reid & Associates, Inc.);
Michael Skerker (United States Naval Academy); Margaret Lawton (Charleston
School of Law); and William Janssen (Charleston School of Law). I would also like to
thank my research assistants John Barnwell Fishburne and Jonathan G. Lane. Without
their help I could not have completed this project. As always, any errors are my own.
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confessing? Can a police officer misrepresent the strength of the case
against the suspect? Can an officer lie about the nature of incriminating
evidence? Can an interrogating officer disguise his or her identity
during the interrogation and pose as a family friend, priest, or someone
friendly to the accused? This article will examine current police
practices in the context of recent Supreme Court cases and social
science findings. I will argue that certain deceptive techniques are
appropriate in the interrogation context. If appropriately utilized,
“trickery” of a certain type does not unreasonably increase the risk of
false confessions and is an appropriate tactic in the hunting of
criminals.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Hunting has been a defining characteristic of human behavior for
over two million years.

–

Sean Hemingway1

Ernest Hemingway is one of this country’s finest writers. His
writing captures the human condition in a way that is both gritty and
romantic at the same time, and that is very hard to do. The phrase, “the
hunting of man,” in the title above, is his. Hemingway was not only a
great writer, but an avid outdoorsman as well. His writing on hunting,
fishing, war, love, conquest, defeat, and human struggle has few
equals. He captured what it means to hunt other men in a famous
phrase that most certainly applies to soldiers in battle, but is equally
applicable to a lot of routine police investigation:
Certainly there is no hunting like the hunting of man and those
who have hunted armed men long enough and liked it, never really
care for anything else thereafter. You will meet them doing
various things with resolve, but their interest rarely holds because
after the other thing ordinary life is flat as the taste of wine when
the taste buds have been burned off your tongue. Wine, when your
tongue has been burned clean with lye and water, feels like puddle
water in your mouth, while mustard feels like axle-grease, and you
can smell crisp, fried bacon, but when you taste it, there is only a

1. SEAN HEMINGWAY, HEMINGWAY ON HUNTING, at xxii (Sean Hemingway ed.,
2001). Sean Hemingway is the grandson of Ernest Hemingway.
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feeling of crinkly lard.2

The second part of the title is taken from another American writer
who was equally gritty in his own way: Mark Twain. Twain said,
“There are three kinds of lies: Lies, damn lies, and statistics.”3 The
replacement of “statistics” with “police interrogation” makes my point.
In the Twain quotation “statistics” is the worst kind of lie, but not
really. Statistics, when properly prepared and presented, constitute
some of the best evidence. So it is with police interrogations.
Interrogations produce some of the best and most reliable evidence:
confessions. However, like statistics, they must be carefully developed
and properly used. The process of interrogation, like gathering data for
statistics, is very technique sensitive. We know that both constitute
good evidence, but only when done correctly.
The criminal process is most aptly captured by the hunting
metaphor. Hunting metaphors are obvious from the case law and the
scholarly commentary. Perhaps the most famous of all the hunting
metaphors is the one from Johnson v. United States,4 referring to law
enforcement as being “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.”5 This phrase has become famous and a standard
mantra to describe the hunting of criminals.6 In fact, as of this writing,
there are no less than fifty-five United States Supreme Court cases that
use this phrase to reference police investigation.7 Police in our
adversarial system hunt criminals. They do this by gathering data,
2. Ernest Hemingway, On the Blue Water: A Gulf Stream Letter, ESQUIRE MAG.,
Apr. 1936, reprinted in HEMINGWAY ON FISHING 125 (Nick Lyon ed., 2000).
3. AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN, VOL. I, at 228 (Harriet E. Smith et al. eds.,
2010). (attributing this quote to the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli); but see
The Meaning and Origin of the Expression: “There are three kinds of lies: Lies,
damned
lies,
and
statistics,”
THE
PHRASE
FINDER,
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics.html (last visited
Sept. 15, 2013) (noting that Disraeli biographers have not uncovered the quotation in
any of Disraeli’s speeches or writings).
4. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
5. 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
6. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14; Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013);
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 158 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 575 (2004); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995); Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 144 (1990); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 552 (1985); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240, (1983).
7. See cases cited supra note 7 (this was revealed by a simple Westlaw search
using the phrase “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”).

24

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

evidence, on persons suspected of breaking the law. An important—
crucial—form of evidence is incriminating statements. One scholar
puts the point even more bluntly:
Every criminal procedure student learns on the first day of class
that [criminal investigation] represents a zero‐sum game: a
constant struggle between the individual privacy of citizens and
the needs of law enforcement. The job of the courts is to mediate
that struggle, to be referees in the “game” of cat‐and‐mouse
between the police officer and the criminal. . . . Judges frequently
refer to criminal investigations as a competitive enterprise, in
which the job of the courts is to maintain the status quo between
both sides. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to act as a safeguard against
the law enforcement officer “engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”8

A substantial debate has opened up in the law over police
interrogation techniques and whether and to what extent certain
interrogation techniques lead to “false confessions” and, therefore,
false convictions. On the one side is the [in?] famous “Reid
Technique” named after John E. Reid who substantially developed it.9
Broadly, but not entirely, in line with Reid is the Supreme Court and
the vast majority of state and federal courts.10 On the other side are the
disciples of the Innocence Project11 and scholars like Richard A. Leo.12
8. Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of
the Fourth Amendment, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 550 (2012). But see, e.g.,
Nicholas A. Snow, A Never Ending Game of Cat and Mouse, REASON.COM (Apr. 16,
2013, 7:00 AM), http://reason.com/archives/2013/04/16/a-never-ending-game-of-catand-mouse (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (noting that he hunting metaphor and never
ending game of cat-and-mouse is even more apparent in the context of drug
prosecutions); see also PETER ANDREAS, SMUGGLER NATION: HOW ILLICIT TRADE
MADE AMERICA (2013).
9. FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, & BRIAN C. JAYNE,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, at xi-xv, 339-77 (5th ed. 2013); John E.
Reid & Associates, Inc., https://www.reid.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
10. See sources cited infra note 18. See also Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 30
(2011). See generally Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1968).
11. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2013).
12. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008);
GEORGE C. THOMAS, III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO
MIRANDA AND BEYOND (2012); POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS:
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G. Daniel Lassiter &
Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012).
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This debate has captured the attention of the elite national media. In
December 2013, The New Yorker published a major article, which
featured, in substantial part, an interview with Joseph Buckley, the
president of John E. Reid & Associates.13 Unfortunately, the piece is
not very informative. It explains very little about the real law of
interrogations and takes a completely uncritical stance toward the so
called “social science” of false confessions.14 This is unfortunate, as I
will contend that the “social scientists”15 are not very scientific in a
great deal of false confessions research, and many courts have agreed.
Much is at stake here. However, the essence of the dispute is whether
or not, and to what extent, a police interrogator may use deceptive
techniques to goad, prompt, or trick suspects into confessing or
otherwise incriminating themselves.
I will argue that in the hunt for criminal suspects, it is appropriate
to use deception to get some suspects to confess. However, not all
deception is appropriate. Lying to persons suspected of crime in order
to trick or prompt them into confessing is neither per se
unconstitutional nor unethical. Furthermore, current legal rules on the
admissibility of confessions are adequate to limit the risk of false
confessions if applied diligently and in good faith. It is not necessary to
overhaul our adversarial system to deal with the risk of false
confessions. We have the tools to deal with this problem, though they
may not be as thoroughly exploited, as they should be. I would also
note that this article addresses routine domestic criminal cases and
investigations. Matters concerning national security or international
terrorism are not my concern here. Rules governing the investigation
and interrogation of terrorists or those engaged in foreign espionage or
acts of war are not the subject matter of this article. For the purposes of
this article, I consider those to be separate issues. Lastly, it is not my
goal to defend the Reid Technique as such. That would be an ambitious
goal and well beyond the scope of this paper. The Reid Technique
involves far more than cleverly misleading suspects in order to prompt
them into confessing. The Reid Technique is a full-blown philosophy
of interrogation and purports to cover a broad range of interrogation
stratagems.
This article will unfold in stages:
13. Douglas Starr, The Interview: Do Police Techniques Produce False
Confessions?, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2013, at 42-49.
14. Id. at 44-45.
15. Id. at 45.
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First, I will set the problem of deception in the police
interrogation context against the background of routine deceptive law
enforcement practices that have been acknowledged and upheld by the
United States Supreme Court.16
Second, confessions are necessary to convict in many cases and
certain forms of deceit are appropriate in obtaining them.17 Despite
what the public is daily bombarded with in television, cinema, and
popular fiction,18 pure forensic science cannot solve most crimes.19
Third, I will set forth the manner in which confessions may be
challenged in the trial court. I will survey the law on when a confession
is admissible and who has the burden of proof regarding its
admissibility. This is significant because it seems to me that much of
the literature on this subject has lost sight of this. We have the legal
tools to address police misconduct during interrogations. We must use
the tools at hand with greater vigor.
Fourth, I will address some of the social science and related
research on both sides of the “false confession” debate.
Lastly, I will propose my own solution to the problem of socalled “false confessions.”
II. POLICE DECEPTION
The Supreme Court has routinely and consistently upheld the use
of deceptive police practices in the investigation of criminal suspects.
It is absolutely clear that law enforcement personnel may engage in
fraud and even lie in the pursuit of legitimate enforcement objectives.
The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and
the apprehension of criminals. . . . . Criminal activity is such that
stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police
16. Hereafter, any reference to the “Supreme Court” refers to the Supreme Court of
the United States.
17. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS at xi-xv,
339-377 (5th ed. 2013); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, &
ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 6.1(a) (3d ed., 2012); Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225
(1973); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004).
18. Arun Rath, Is the ‘CSI Effect’ Influencing Courtrooms?, NPR (Sept. 15, 2013,
9:30pm),
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/06/133497696/is-the-csi-effect-influencingcourtrooms; The “CSI Effect,” THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24 2010, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/15949089.
19. See sources cited supra note 10.
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officer.20
This rule has been often applied in cases where undercover law
enforcement activity is necessary to uncover criminal activity. This is
particularly so in cases involving violent crime, narcotics investigation,
and organized criminal activity.21
Indeed, it has long been acknowledged by the decisions of this
Court, see Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895) and
Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420, 423 (1896),5 that, in the
detection of many types of crime, the Government is entitled to
use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents.22
...

Former Chief Justice Hughes commented as follows upon the use
of official deception in combating criminal activity: “Artifice and
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal
enterprises. . . . The appropriate object of this permitted activity,
frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the
criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited
publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy,
or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would-be violators of
the law.” Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-442
(1932).23

This line of cases was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in Jacobson v. United States.24 In Jacobson, Lopez,25 and Hampton v.
United States,26 the Court addressed the issue of entrapment. However,
entrapment only occurs when the government’s deception is such as to
actually “implant” the crime in the defendant’s mind and “induce” the
defendant to do something he was not already predisposed to do.27 The
mere fact that the criminal suspect is given ample opportunity or even
20. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973).
21. See sources cited supra note 21. See also Sorrells v. United States, 53 U.S. 435
(1932); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 322 (1966).
22. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209. See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465
(1963).
23. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209 n. 5.
24. 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1991). See also sources cited supra note 19.
25. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
26. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
27. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 547-550; Hampton, 424 U.S. at 486-8; Lopez, 373 U.S.
at 434-7.
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encouragement to commit the crime is insufficient to support
entrapment.28 Short of such misconduct by the police, deception is not
problematic. In addition, whether or not entrapment exists is ultimately
a question for the jury.29
A second and very important line of cases concerns the “false
friends” doctrine.30 In this line of cases the Supreme Court considered
police deception in falsely befriending potential criminal suspects with
the goal of gaining their trust in order to betray them. This line of cases
holds that when law enforcement employs the “false friend” technique
it violates neither the Fourth, Fifth, nor Sixth Amendments.31
The Hoffa case involved the infamous President of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Jimmy Hoffa.32 A government
informant who was close to Hoffa, but unknown by Hoffa to be an
informant, repeatedly reported Hoffa’s conversations and comments to
a federal agent.33 While there was some dispute between the
government and the Petitioner, Hoffa, as to how to state the issue
before the Court, the Court seemed to accept the Petitioner’s statement
of the issue.
Whether evidence obtained by the Government by means of
deceptively placing a secret informer in the quarters and councils
of a defendant during one criminal trial so violates the defendant’s
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights that suppression of such
evidence is required in a subsequent trial of the same defendant on
a different charge.34

The Court found that Hoffa’s constitutional rights were not
violated. In so doing, the Court relied on and elaborated upon its
previous decision in Lopez:35
Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the
view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it. Indeed, the Court unanimously
rejected that very contention less than four years ago in Lopez v.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See sources cited supra notes 21-23 and 28.
Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542.
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 302-3.
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United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). In that case the petitioner had
been convicted of attempted bribery of an internal revenue agent
named Davis. The Court was divided with regard to the
admissibility in evidence of a surreptitious electronic recording of
an incriminating conversation Lopez had had in his private office
with Davis. But there was no dissent from the view that testimony
about the conversation by Davis himself was clearly admissible.36

Interestingly, the majority of the Court in Hoffa went further and
cited with approval the dissenting opinion in Lopez:
In the words of the dissenting opinion in Lopez, “The risk of being
overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or
deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably
inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk
we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”37

The Court next considered Hoffa’s claim that his Fifth
Amendment rights were violated. It concluded, citing to the case of
Aaron Burr, that there was no Fifth Amendment violation:
But since at least as long ago as 1807, when Chief Justice
Marshall first gave attention to the matter in the trial of Aaron
Burr, all have agreed that a necessary element of compulsory selfincrimination is some kind of compulsion.38

The Court’s holding regarding “compulsion” is significant.
Without some kind of compulsion in the interrogation context, there is
no constitutional error.39 The Court specifically noted that “the
petitioner’s incriminating statements were [not] the product of any sort
of coercion, legal or factual.”40 We will return to this point later. The
Court also rejected the Sixth Amendment claims, but for reasons that
are not closely related to the main thesis of this article.41
The Court then took up United States v. White.42 White was
different from Hoffa in that White was decided after the Court’s
seminal case of Katz v. United States.43 Because Katz altered the basic
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 303 (quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 303-4 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 304-11.
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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test for a Fourth Amendment “search,” the Court was called upon to reanalyze the “false friends” doctrine in light of its Katz decision.44 The
Court affirmed its prior rulings in Hoffa and Lopez.45 The slight
difference in White was that the suspect’s conversations were not only
overheard and encouraged by a “false friend,” they were recorded as
well.
If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect
him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the
conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the
State’s case. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and
risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he
sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very
probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his. In terms of
what his course will be, what he will or will not do or say, we are
un-persuaded that he would distinguish between probably
informers on the one hand and probable informers with
transmitters on the other. Given the possibility or probability that
one of his colleagues is cooperating with the police, it is only
speculation to assert that the defendant’s utterances would be
substantially different or his sense of security any less if he also
thought it possible that the suspected colleague is wired for
sound.46

Perhaps White seems obvious or even innocuous to the modern
reader because police surveillance of this sort has become so accepted
and even expected.47 However, the issue of using undercover police or
44. White, 401 U.S. at 747-49 (discussing the holding in Katz at length, where the
Court adopted a two prong test to determine whether a “search” had occurred. The test
basically asks whether the suspect has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in
the place searched, and, second, whether that expectation is reasonable, that is, one that
society is willing to respect. The Court emphasized that Katz abandoned the trespass
text, which had been used in the past).
45. Id. at 747-54.
46. Id. at 752-53.
47. Michael Powell, On Reed-Thin Evidence, A Very Wide Net of Police
Surveillance,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
9,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/nyregion/on-reed-thin-evidence-a-very-wide-netof-police-surveillance.html; Jim Dwyer, Police Infiltrate Protests, Video Tapes Show,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
22,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/22/nyregion/22police.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print;
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police informants in this manner was very controversial at the time and
the stakes were thought to be high. In order to fully appreciate the
impact of the Court’s ruling permitting this kind of police deception,
one only needs to read from Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent. It is
worth quoting at length:
Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and
spontaneous utterances. Free discourse-a First Amendment valuemay be frivolous or serious, humble or defiant, reactionary or
revolutionary, profane or in good taste; but it is not free if there is
surveillance. Free discourse liberates the spirit, though it may
produce only froth. The individual must keep some facts
concerning his thoughts within a small zone of people. At the
same time he must be free to pour out his woes or inspirations or
dreams to others. He remains the sole judge as to what must be
said and what must remain unspoken. This is the essence of the
idea of privacy implicit in the First and Fifth Amendments as well
as in the Fourth. The philosophy of the value of privacy reflected
in the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable searches and

seizures” has been forcefully stated by a former Attorney
General of the United States:

“Privacy is the basis of individuality. To be alone and be let
alone, to be with chosen company, to say what you think, or
don’t think, but to say what you will, is to be yourself.
Solitude is imperative, even in a high-rise apartment.
Personality develops from within. To reflect is to know
yourself. Character is formed through years of selfexamination. Without this opportunity, character will be
formed largely by uncontrolled external social stimulations.
Americans are excessively homogenized already. Few
conversations would be what they are if the speakers thought
others were listening. Silly, secret, thoughtless and
thoughtful statements would all be affected. The sheer
numbers in our lives, the anonymity of urban living and the
inability to influence things that are important are
depersonalizing and dehumanizing factors of modern life.
To penetrate the last refuge of the individual, the precious

MATT APUZZO & ADAM GOLDMAN, ENEMIES WITHIN: INSIDE THE NYPD’S SECRET
SPYING UNIT AND BIN LADEN’S FINAL PLOT AGAINST AMERICA (Touchstone 2013). See
generally UNDERCOVER-POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Cyrille
Fignaut & Gary T. Marx eds., 1995).
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little privacy that remains, the basis of individual dignity,
can have meaning to the quality of our lives that we cannot
foresee. In terms of present values, that meaning cannot be
good. Invasions of privacy demean the individual. Can a
society be better than the people composing it? When a
government degrades its citizens, or permits them to degrade
each other, however beneficent the specific purpose, it limits
opportunities for individual fulfillment and national
accomplishment. If America permits fear and its failure to
make basic social reforms to excuse police use of secret
electronic surveillance, the price will be dear indeed. The
practice is incompatible with a free society.” R. Clark,
Crime in America 287 (1970).

Now that the discredited decisions in On Lee48 and Lopez are
resuscitated and revived, must everyone live in fear that every
word he speaks may be transmitted or recorded and later repeated
to the entire world? I can imagine nothing that has a more chilling
effect on people speaking their minds and expressing their views
on important matters. The advocates of that regime should spend
some time in totalitarian countries and learn firsthand the kind of
regime they are creating here.49

Justice Douglas was, as ever, eloquent. However, his dissent has
not been revived by the Court and with each passing term his articulate
contrarian viewpoint slips ever further into the past.
In the very recent case of Kentucky v. King,50 the Court held that
police could create an exigency in the Fourth Amendment search
context. The Court has long held that exigent circumstances provide a
basis for entering premises and searching them without a warrant.51
The basic idea is that where full probable cause exists and police need
to act quickly to prevent the destruction of evidence,52 to protect life
and limb,53 or to catch a fleeing suspect,54 the police may act without a
48. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
49. Id. at 762-65 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
50. 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
51. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398
(2006); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967).
52. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849.
53. See sources cited supra note 52.
54. See sources cited supra note 52.
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warrant and enter premises to resolve the exigency.55 However, the
issue in King was whether, when acting on the particular exigent
circumstance to prevent the destruction of evidence, the creation of the
exigency by the police would operate to void the exigency. The Court
held, contra many lower courts, that it was irrelevant whether the
police had created the exigency. As long as the police do not otherwise
violate the Fourth Amendment – and creating the exigency is not a per
se violation – it does not matter how the exigency arose.56 The potential
in this context for the police to use deception to avoid the warrant
requirement is obvious. In King, the police believed marijuana was
inside an apartment.57 They knocked on the door and loudly announced
themselves as police, though they did not demand entrance.58 The
officer then heard suspicious noises inside that sounded like people
scurrying around to dispose of the drugs.59 The police then entered.60
Thus, if police can prompt or trick suspects into thinking they are
going to enter premises and find them with contraband or evidence of a
crime, and the suspects behave in such a manner as to give police
probable cause that they are destroying the evidence or contraband, the
police may enter without a warrant. It is certainly conceivable that
police can and will use this ruling to trick suspects into engaging in
actions that will give police a basis to enter premises that they could
otherwise not enter.
In Illinois v. Perkins,61 an undercover government agent was
placed in the cell with Perkins. At the time, Perkins was incarcerated
on charges totally unrelated to the agent’s investigation. During the
course of conversation, Perkins made comments that incriminated him.
Perkins later claimed that the statements should not have been admitted
as Perkins had not been read his Miranda62 rights.63 However, the
Court held that the statements were admissible.64 The Court upheld the
55. See sources cited supra note 52.
56. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857-61.
57. Id. at 1854-5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
62. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 294 (noting that the Sixth Amendment was not applicable
as Perkins was not indicated or formally charged with the crimes that were under
investigation).
64. Id.
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agents’ conduct as a valid form of “strategic deception.”

Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking
advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a
fellow prisoner. As we recognized in Miranda: “[C]onfessions
remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given
freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of
course, admissible in evidence.” 384 U.S., at 478. Ploys to mislead
a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise
to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within
Miranda’s concerns. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,
495–496, (1977) (per curiam); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (where police fail to
inform suspect of attorney’s efforts to reach him, neither Miranda
nor the Fifth Amendment requires suppression of pre-arraignment
confession after voluntary waiver). Miranda was not meant to
protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in
front of persons whom they believe to be their cellmates. . . . The
tactic employed here to elicit a voluntary confession from a
suspect does not violate the Self–Incrimination Clause. We held in
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), that placing an
undercover agent near a suspect in order to gather incriminating
information was permissible under the Fifth Amendment. In
Hoffa, while petitioner Hoffa was on trial, he met often with one
Partin, who, unbeknownst to Hoffa, was cooperating with law
enforcement officials. Partin reported to officials that Hoffa had
divulged his attempts to bribe jury members. We approved using
Hoffa’s statements at his subsequent trial for jury tampering, on
the rationale that “no claim ha[d] been or could [have been] made
that [Hoffa’s] incriminating statements were the product of any
sort of coercion, legal or factual.” Id., at 304. In addition, we
found that the fact that Partin had fooled Hoffa into thinking that
Partin was a sympathetic colleague did not affect the voluntariness
of the statements. Ibid. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S.,
at 495–496 (officer’s falsely telling suspect that suspect’s
fingerprints had been found at crime scene did not render
interview “custodial” under Miranda); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 739 (1969); Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453–454
(1971). The only difference between this case and Hoffa is that the
suspect here was incarcerated, but detention, whether or not for
the crime in question, does not warrant a presumption that the use
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of an undercover agent to speak with an incarcerated suspect
makes any confession thus obtained involuntary.65

In the Sixth Amendment context, as opposed to the Fifth
Amendment context of Perkins, it is still permissible to place
informants or undercover officers in cells with inmates pending trial.
However, such undercover officers or informants may only passively
listen to the inmate. They may not encourage in or take part in
conversation. In the Sixth Amendment context, it is strictly forbidden
to initiate contact with a criminal suspect if their Sixth Amendment
rights have attached.66
Lastly, two cases are of great importance on the issue of police
deception in the course of interrogation: Frazier v. Cupp67 and Bobby v.
Dixon.68
In Frazier, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion of the
Court in which both Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O.
Douglas joined in the result. Frazier appears to have been a marine
who was charged with murder along with his cousin, Rawls.69 There
are two important aspects to this case, which are highly relevant for
this article. First, during the course of the interrogation Frazier “was
reluctant to talk, but after the officer sympathetically suggested that the
victim had started a fight by making homosexual advances, [Frazier]
began to spill out his story.”70 Second, the police lied to Frazier about
the nature and strength of the evidence against him. They indicated that
Rawls had implicated him.71 Nevertheless, the Court found that this did
not amount to coercion under the “totality of the circumstances.”72
In Dixon, a 2011 case, the Court reaffirmed that merely
misrepresenting the strength of the state’s case to the suspect is
insufficient to render a confession inadmissible.73
[T]he Sixth Circuit held that police violated the Fifth Amendment

65. Id. at 297-99.
66. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436 (1986).
67. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
68. 132 S. Ct. 26 (2011) (per curiam).
69. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 733, 737-38.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 739.
72. Id.
73. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 29-30.

36

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

by urging Dixon to “cut a deal” before his accomplice Hoffner did
so. The Sixth Circuit cited no precedent of this Court—or any
court—holding that this common police tactic is unconstitutional.
Cf., e.g., [Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985)] (“[T]he
Court has refused to find that a defendant who confesses, after
being falsely told that his codefendant has turned State’s evidence,
does so involuntarily”). Because no holding of this Court suggests,
much less clearly establishes, that police may not urge a suspect to
confess before another suspect does so . . . .74

Interestingly, Dixon is a per curiam opinion. It appears that not a
single member of the Court objected to this language. It clearly harkens
back to Frazier and the long line of precedent set forth above.
Regarding the lower courts, both state and federal,75 Frazier and Dixon
74. Id. In State v. Parker, 671 S.E.2d 619, 630 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (summarizing
the rule: Few criminals feel impelled to confess to the police purely of their own
accord without any questioning at all . . . . Thus, it can almost always be said that the
interrogation caused the confession . . . It is generally recognized that the police may
use some psychological tactics in eliciting a statement from a suspect . . . These ploys
may play a part in the suspect’s decision to confess, but so long as that decision is a
product of the suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations, the confession is
voluntary).
See also State v. Von Dohlen, 471 S.E.2d 689, 695 (S.C. 1996) (quoting Miller v.
Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 604-5 (3d Cir. 1986)).
75. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc.
§ 6.2(c) (3d ed., 2012) (citing and summarizing many precedents).
Similarly, lower courts have held confessions admissible when they were prompted by
such misrepresentations as that the murder victim was still alive, or had died of natural
causes, that the police only sought defendant’s statement as a witness, that nonexistent
witnesses have been found, that the murder weapon had been uncovered, that
defendant’s prints were found at the crime scene, that an accomplice had confessed and
implicated the defendant, that defendant’s relatives had implicated him, that DNA
evidence linked defendant to the crime, that the crime was captured by a video camera,
that other physical evidence implicated the defendant, or that the results of defendant’s
polygraph exam showed that he had lied. So too, it is not objectionable that the police
failed to reveal to the defendant prior to questioning any exculpatory evidence then at
hand. (Clearly there is nothing improper with confronting the suspect with the actual
evidence against him, though if that evidence was illegally come by then defendant’s
statement in response is likely to be treated as the inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous
tree.”) Courts are much less likely to tolerate misrepresentations of law. Thus,
confessions have been held involuntary when obtained in response to a false police
representation that the jury would never hear defendant’s side of the story unless
defendant gave it to the police now, that the confession could not be used against the
defendant at trial, that the confession would be kept confidential or the defendant
granted immunity, that the results of defendant’s prior polygraph test showing he lied
would be admissible against him in court, or that the previously obtained confession of
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are very sound law.76 The use of deception and trickery in obtaining
a confession, without more, does not render the confession coerced
and, therefore, involuntary under the Constitution.77 As an additional
an accomplice could be so used. Moreover, a distinction must be made between the
kind of trickery discussed earlier, involving facts of which a defendant has firsthand
knowledge, and trickery by “a lie unrelated to the government’s evidence of his guilt,
that had consequences to others,” as the latter instance is more likely to induce an
innocent person to give a confession.
Accord Annual Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc.,
187, 212-3 (2012) (citing many cases).
76. C. T. Dreschsler, Annotation, Admissibility of Confession as Affected by Its
Inducement Through Artifice, Deception, Trickery, or Fraud, 99 A.L.R. 2d 772 (2013).
One widely used text on modern criminal procedure puts it this way:
A leading interrogation manual, authored by Inbau, Reid, and Buckley, argues the
merits of deceptive interrogation techniques in leading to confessions. The techniques
they recommend include:
showing fake sympathy for the suspect by acting like his friend (e.g., by falsely telling
a rape suspect that the officer himself had once “roughed it up” with a girl in an
attempt to have intercourse with her);
reducing the suspect’s feelings of guilt through lies (e.g., by telling a person suspected
of killing his wife that he was not as “lucky” as the officer, who at one time was just
about to “pound” his wife when the doorbell rang);
exaggerating the crime in an effort to get the suspect to negotiate, or in hopes of
obtaining a denial which will indirectly inculpate the suspect (e.g., accusing the suspect
of stealing $40,000 when only $20,000 is involved, or accusing the suspect of murder
where the victim, while shot, survived the incident); and
playing one codefendant against another (e.g., leading one to believe the other has
confessed when no confession has occurred).
INBAU, REID & BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 98-132 (3d ed.
1986) [This is an earlier edition of the book referenced in note 74]. Tactics such as
these are routinely permitted by the courts in applying the voluntariness test. See e.g.,
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (holding use of “false friend” and “game is up”
techniques, although relevant to the due process inquiry, were not sufficient to render
the confession involuntary); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding use
of “false friend” technique, together with a ruse that the victim had not died when in
fact she had, does not render confession involuntary). See also Deborah Young,
Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425 (1996)
(providing citations to lower court cases refusing to exclude confessions obtained after
the suspect was exposed to lies about matters such as the strength of the case,
fabricated evidence, suggestions that the suspect was not at fault, and lies about the
identity of the interrogator).
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 663-4 (9th ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
77. Dreschsler, supra note 77; e.g., Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police interrogation
Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1197-1209 (2001) (defending
the same proposition) (“A compelling argument has not yet been made that drastic
limits on the use of deceptive interrogation techniques are either required or advisable.
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note, ethical challenges to police deception in the interrogation context
have consistently been brushed aside for many of the same reasons that
have led to its general acceptance under the constitution.78
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFESSIONS
While the topic is still somewhat debatable,79 I think there is little
doubt that confessions in particular, and incriminating statements in
general,80 play a huge role in investigating and successfully prosecuting
. . . In advocating limits on deceptive techniques, however, some commentators have
overstated the false confession problem and minimized the costs of limiting
interrogation.”). Id. at 1209. (dealing with other arguments that from time to time have
been raised against the use of trickery in interrogation: “fox-hunter” rationale, equality
among suspects, trust rationale, dignity rationale, morality rationale, and various
pragmatic concerns). Id. at 1179-1186. (I have not explored such arguments because
these lines of argument have been largely discredited for the reason Magid offers and,
thus, have disappeared from serious literature on this subject). See also William J.
Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 1905
(1993) (“Deception and advantage taking are . . . at the core of criminal investigation . .
. .”); MICHAEL SKERKER, AN ETHICS OF INTERROGATION 90-114, 207-213 (2010); FRED
E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONAL AND CONFESSIONS 339-377 (5th ed.
2013); Critics Corner: Trickery and Deceit; Subterfuge; Additional Cases, John E.
Reid & Associates, Inc. (collecting cases) (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30 AM),
https://www.reid.com/educational_info/trickery.html; New Decisions, John E. Reid &
Associates, Inc., (collecting cases) (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30 AM),
https://www.reid.com/educational_info/r_ccorner.html; Critics Corner: Lying About
Evidence: Pretending to Have Evidence Against Accused, Generally – Confession Held
Admissible, John E. Reid & Associates, Inc. (collecting cases) (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30
AM), https://www.reid.com/educational_info/lyingaboutevidence.html.
78. See sources cited supra note 78.
79. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc.
§ 6.1(a) (3d ed., 2012) (some might wonder how could it possibly be “debatable” that
confessions and other incriminating statements are so important in criminal
investigations? Isn’t this obvious after all? However, from time to time, there has been
more than a bit of hedging on the issue of whether confessions are really that
important).
80. For the purposes of this article, the distinction between confessions and
incriminating statements is not significant. However, for my purposes the distinction is
one of degree. A confession is a complete admission of all the material facts by the
accused or something very near to it, e.g.:
“I always hated him. I saw him out alone, so I snuck up behind him and hit him in the
back of the head with a tire iron I got out of the trunk of my car. He never saw me
coming. He hit the ground, and I kept hitting him with the tire iron–over and over and
over. He never had a chance. I wanted him dead and good riddance!”
An incriminating statement is something the accused says, but it falls short of a full or
complete admission. It makes the accused look bad. It is relevant in that it tends to
prove one or more of the elements of the crime, but standing alone it is insufficient to
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crime. This largely constitutes the positive case for police deception in
interrogation, and it is important to my main thesis: I contend that
opponents of some very effective police interrogation techniques forget
how important it is to persuade the suspect to answer basic questions
about their involvement in the crime.
One of the most eloquent statements by the Supreme Court on the
necessity of confessions came in Culombe v. Connecticut:81
The critical elements of the problem may be quickly isolated in
light of what has already been said. Its first pole is the recognition
that “Questioning suspects is indispensable in law enforcement.”
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey put it recently: “the public
interest requires that interrogation, and that at a police station, not
completely be forbidden, so long as it is conducted fairly,
reasonably, within proper limits and with full regard to the rights
of those being questioned.” But if it is once admitted that
questioning of suspects is permissible, whatever reasonable means
are needed to make the questioning effective must also be
conceded to the police. Often prolongation of the interrogation
period will be essential, so that a suspect’s story can be checked
and, if it proves untrue, he can be confronted with the lie; if true,
released without charge. Often the place of questioning will have
to be a police interrogation room, both because it is important to
assure the proper atmosphere of privacy and non-distraction if
questioning is to be made productive, and because, where a
suspect is questioned but not taken into custody, he—and in some
cases his associates—may take prompt warning and flee the

establish guilt, e.g.:
“Yes, I was the last person to see him that night. We had an awful argument. I was
furious with him, but I stormed out. I never saw him again. I’m glad he’s dead!”
The difference between these two statements is obvious. The first is a complete
admission to murder or perhaps a homicide in the first degree. The second is relevant
in that it puts the suspect at the scene and gives him a motive, thus, it is relevant on the
issue of guilt. However, if strictly true, the suspect is entirely innocent. On an
additional note, some might consider the statements made by a defendant during the
course of a formal plea of guilty in a courtroom to be “confessions” as well. However,
I do not address guilty pleas. Pleas of guilty are beyond the scope of his article.
Statements by a defendant at guilty pleas simply are not part of “police interrogation”
in any meaningful sense. At a guilty plea a defendant is typically represented by
counsel (or has the right to be represented), the plea is made before the court (a judge),
and the entire proceeding is typically transcribed by a court reporter.
81. 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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premises.82

One of the most well-known interrogation manuals in use by
many law enforcement, military, and government agencies in the
United States puts the matter this way:
There is a gross misconception, generated and perpetuated by
fiction writers, movies, and TV, that when criminal investigators
carefully examine a crime scene they will almost always find a
clue that will lead them to the offender; furthermore, once the
criminal is located, he or she will readily confess or otherwise
reveal guilt, as by attempting to escape. This, however, is pure
fiction. As a matter of fact, the art and science of criminal
investigation have not developed to a point where the search for
and the examination of physical evidence will always, or even in
most cases, reveal a clue to the identity of the perpetrator or
provide the necessary legal proof of guilt. In criminal
investigations, even the most efficient type, there are many
instances where physical clues are entirely absent, and the only
approach to a possible solution of the crime is the interrogation of
the criminal suspect himself, as well as of others who may possess
significant information. In most instances these interrogations,
particularly of the suspect, must be conducted under conditions of
privacy and for a reasonable period of time. They also frequently
required the use of psychological tactics and techniques that could
well be classified as “unethical,” if evaluated in terms of ordinary,
everyday social behavior . . . There are times, too, when a police
interrogation may result not only in the apprehension and
conviction of the guilty, but also in the release of the innocent
from well-warranted suspicion.83

One view of the situation regarding “forensic evidence” is that
genuine forensic evidence is collected in less than 10% of all cases. Of
all such evidence collected, approximately half is subjected to
scientific analysis.84 While more recent studies show that the use of
82. Id. at 570-71; See also Ralph v. Peppersack, 335 F.2d 128, 137 n. 16 (4th Cir.
1961).
83. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS at xi-xii
(5th ed. 2013). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2
Crim. Proc. § 6.1(a) (3d ed., 2012).
84. F. Horvath & R. Messig, The Criminal Investigation Process and the Role of
Forensic Evidence: A Review of Empirical Findings, 41 J. FORENSIC SCI. 963 (Nov.
1996).
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forensic techniques are on the increase, it still appears that forensic
evidence alone does not resolve the clear majority of crimes.85
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,86 a seminal case dealing with
consent in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court, following
Culombe, has continued to acknowledge the necessity of allowing law
enforcement to question suspects.
At one end of the spectrum is the acknowledged need for police
questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal
laws. See Culombe v. Connecticut, [367 U.S. 568, 578-580
(1961)]. Without such investigation, those who were innocent
might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly
escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short,
the security of all would be diminished. Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 515, (1963).87

In Illinois v. Lidster,88 the Court emphasized the role of routine
police interrogation in the broadest possible sense. Police are expected
to question potential witnesses and suspects. Police questioning is
vital—even questioning of obviously innocent persons—to the
successful investigation and prosecution of criminal activity.
Further, the law ordinarily permits police to seek the voluntary
cooperation of members of the public in the investigation of a
crime. “[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or
in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer
some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is
willing to listen.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, (1983). See
also ALI, Model Code of Pre–Arraignment Procedure § 110.1(1)
(1975) (“[L]aw enforcement officer may ... request any person to
furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or
prevention of crime”). That, in part, is because voluntary requests

85. Sarah-Anne Bradbury & Andy Feist, The Use of Forensic Science in Violent
Crime Investigations: A Review of the Research Literature 2005, HOME OFFICE UNITED
KINGDOM,
8-12
(Sept.
22,
2013,
11:30
AM),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115849/
hoor4305.pdf; Joseph Peterson, Ira Sommers, Deborah Baskin, & Donald Johnson, The
Role and Impact of Forensic Evidence in the Criminal Justice Process Revised Final
Report 6-10-10, NATIONAL INST. OF JUST. 122-130 (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30 AM),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf.
86. 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
87. Id.
88. 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004).
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play a vital role in police investigatory work. See, e.g., Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) (“[I]nterrogation of
witnesses ... is undoubtedly an essential tool in effective law
enforcement”); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A
Guide for Law Enforcement 14–15 (Oct. 1999) (instructing law
enforcement to gather information from witnesses near the
scene).89

Thus, the Court makes it clear that a kind of ordinary, routine,
old-fashioned police work is still necessary and appropriate to the
investigation of crime.90
One of the most powerful indicators that police interrogations are
necessary to criminal investigation and the protection of the public is
when one of the foremost critics of police interrogation practices
eloquently admits it. Professor Richard A. Leo puts it this way:
Police interrogation and confession taking is enormously
important for society. It is, of course, often necessary in
investigating and solving crime, especially felony crime. Some
crimes, such as conspiracy and extortion, or even rape and child
abuse, frequently can be conclusively solved only by a confession
since there may be no other evidence of guilt. Other serious
crimes, such as murder, are more commonly solved by
confessions than by any other type of evidence [citations omitted].
Done properly, police interrogation can thus be an unmitigated
social benefit. It can allow authorities to capture, prosecute, and
convict wrongdoers and deter crime. These are enormously
important outcomes.91

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, 2-3 (2008).
See e.g., Katherine Sheridan, Note, Excluding Coerced Witness Testimony to Protect a
Criminal Defendant’s Right to Due Process of Law and Adequately Deter Police
Misconduct, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1221, 1223-24 (2011); Michael J. Aiello, Note,
United States v. Barone: Evaluating Police Re-Interrogation After Mosley – Courts
Must Consider the Suspect’s State of Mind, 2 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 707, 714 (I993);
Gregory E. Spitzer, Supreme Court Review, Fifth Amendment – Validity of Waiver: A
Suspect Need Not Know the Subjects of Interrogation, 78 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
828, 851-52 (1988); Scott A. McCreight, Comment, Colorado v. Connelly: Due
Process Challenges To Confessions and Evidentiary Reliability Interests, 73 IOWA L.
REV. 207, 223 (1987). (Deceptive interrogation techniques have value. Deception is
needed to obtain some confessions, confessions are needed to obtain some convictions,
and those convictions provide great value to society–specifically to existing victims,
future potential victims, and innocent persons who might have been wrongly charged
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One of the most recent works dealing with the problem of
improper police interrogations and “false confessions” is an anthology
entitled, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS:
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS,
edited by G. Daniel Lassiter and Christian A. Meissner. It represents
some of the latest scholarship on the topic as of this writing.
Interestingly, it does not go so far as to bar police interrogation or even
require an attorney actually be present.92 Much more will be said of this
work later. For now, it is only significant to note that the method of
interrogation is all that is seriously in dispute. Two other prominent
scholars, whose work strongly challenges some police techniques in
interrogation, nevertheless admitted: “confessions play a vital role in
law enforcement and crime control.”93
Police interrogation is here to stay. It is an absolutely necessary
tool for criminal investigation. The only question that remains is what
techniques police may use to persuade suspects to talk with them about
their role in the crime.
IV. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
So far, this article has unfolded in a way that logically leads to
this point. We began with a discussion of police deception in general
with an emphasis on deception in the interrogation context. I then
pointed out that there is abundant authority for the proposition that
confessions secured by means of police interrogation are absolutely
essential in routine law enforcement investigation. In this context, I
hope to have demonstrated that courts at the state and federal level
absent a confession by the true perpetrator. In some instances, the police must use
deception to obtain a confession from a suspect. Relatively few suspects enter the
interrogation room and promptly offer a full and truthful confession of their
wrongdoing. Confessions usually occur only after some form of deception by the
officer, from hiding the officer’s true feelings about the suspect or the nature of the
crime to exaggerating the strength of the evidence). Laurie Magrid, Deceptive Police
Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1197-98
(2001). See also William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79
VA. L. REV. 1903, 1905 (1993) (“Deception and advantage taking are . . . at the core of
criminal investigation . . . “); MICHAEL SKERKER, AN ETHICS OF INTERROGATION, 90114, 207-213 (2010).
92. POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 225-29 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A.
Meissner eds., 2012).
93. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A
Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 36 (2004).
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have overwhelmingly approved of certain deceptive tactics by police in
order to secure confessions and other incriminating statements.
Before addressing some of the social science and recent research
on confessions and police interrogations, it is necessary to address in
some detail the law concerning the admissibility of confessions and
custodial statements in general. It is my contention that a lot of the
professional literature in this area has overlooked this aspect of
confessions and police interrogation law. As such, spurious
conclusions have been reached based on an inadequate appreciation of
the current state of the law.
To briefly preview, current confessions law requires a three-step
analysis of any custodial statement made by an accused to law
enforcement, which is later sought to be admitted as evidence in a
criminal trial.94 First, the standard analysis must be made under
applicable rules of evidence. While this level of analysis is not a
concern for purposes of this article, such statements are usually
admissible because they are relevant (e.g., FRE 401-2) and because
they are admissions by a party opponent (e.g., FRE 801(d)(2)). The
next two levels of analysis are very important for our purposes.
Second, the statements must be “voluntary,” that is, “voluntarily”
made, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.95 This is often referred to as the due process voluntariness
test.96 Third, and last, the statements in question must pass muster
under Miranda v. Arizona97 and its progeny. The change wrought by
Miranda is that the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
is applicable in the pre-trial investigation phase of the criminal
process.98 If a statement passes all three hurdles, it may be considered
by the trier of fact on the issue of guilt or innocence. The precise
details of this process are crucial, because it is my contention that the
law as it stands is more than adequate to deal with overbearing police
94. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 10.5(a)-(c), 10.6(a) (3d ed., 2012); Annual
Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 187, 213-14
(2012) (including cases cited therein); R.E.H., Annotation, Presumption and Burden of
Proof as to Voluntariness of Nonjudicial Confession, 76 A.L.R. 641 (2013).
95. See sources cited supra note 95. See also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884);
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
96. See sources cited supra note 96.
97. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
98. Id.
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conduct in the interrogations context. Existing law provides us with
ample tools to determine what kind of police conduct is likely to
produce a false confession and what kind of police conduct will simply
persuade the guilty to give up their secrets.
Our modern law, constitutional and otherwise, governing the
admissibility of confessions has its origins in the common law. Under
the early common law, confessions were admissible at trial without any
restrictions whatsoever, so that even an incriminating statement, which
had been obtained by torture, was not excluded. But some time prior to
the middle of the eighteenth century, English trial judges began placing
restrictions on the admissibility of confessions. A formal rule of
exclusion appears to have been first stated in 1783 in the case of The
King v. Warickshall, wherein it was asserted:
A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit,
because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt,
and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers;
but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or
by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is
to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be
given to it; and therefore it is rejected.99

The Warickshall rule, as later followed in England and the United
States, was designed to protect a defendant from an erroneous
conviction based upon a false confession. . . . Sometimes, as in
Warickshall, the question was put in terms of whether the defendant’s
confession had been induced by a promise of benefit or threat of harm,
while on other occasions the inquiry was more directly put in terms of
whether the circumstances under which the defendant had spoken
impaired the reliability of the confession. But it became more common
for the courts simply to ask whether the confession had been made
“voluntarily.” Generally, the approach under the common law rule was
to identify certain inducements, which made a confession unreliable.
These included actual or threatened physical harm, a promise not to
prosecute, a promise to provide lenient treatment upon conviction, and
deceptive practices so extreme that they might have produced a false
confession. The latter did not include such practices as using a fellow
prisoner as an undercover agent or misleading the defendant as to the
99. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 6.2(a) (3d
ed., 2012) (citing King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, L. Leach Cr. Cases 263
(K.B.1783)).

46

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

strength of the case against him.100 The Warickshall case is still
representative of the central theme of the jurisprudence in this area.
When it comes to police misconduct, the focus is still on two central
points: (1) promises by the police to persuade the suspect to speak or
threats designed to coerce the suspect into doing so, and (2) tactics that
constitute the “third degree.”101 If a court finds either, suppression of
the confession/statement is generally required.102 This is the essence of
what makes a confession involuntary under the due process standard.103
More specifically, promises or threats which go to the nature of the
charge or possible sentence (murder vs. manslaughter, first degree vs.
second degree, probation, life imprisonment, death penalty, parole,
etc.), the terms and conditions of confinement (solitary, general
population with other dangerous offenders, sent to a faraway facility,
etc.), and whether bond/bail shall be granted and, if so, under what
conditions generally constitute promises or threats that will render a
confession inadmissible.104 So called “third degree” tactics, which
include any number of things including beatings; deprivation of sleep,
food, and water; lengthy interrogations; and sometimes extreme deceit
designed to trick one into giving up one’s constitutional right not to
speak, have been found to vitiate a confession.105 “Third degree”
100. Id. See generally YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY, 1–25 (1980); WILLIAM RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS, ch. 25 (2d ed. 1980); OTIS H. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME
COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 31–62 (1973); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness,
Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979); Joseph D. Grano,
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1996); Wilfred J. Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of
State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
35 (1962); H. Frank Way, Jr., The Supreme Court and State Coerced Confessions, 12
J. PUB. L. 53 (1963); Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998); Developments, 79 HARV. L. REV. 938, 961–82 (1966).
101. See sources cited supra note 95.
102. See sources cited supra note 95.
103. See sources cited supra note 95.
104. See sources cited supra note 101.
105. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 76 (“[T]he Court has condemned such
practices as whipping or slapping the suspect, depriving him of food or water or sleep,
keeping him in a naked state or in a small cell, holding a gun to his head or threatening
him with mob violence. As the Court noted in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953),
when such outrageous conduct is present ‘there is no need to weigh or measure its
effects on the will of the individual victim.’”); but see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279 (1991) (seeming unconcerned about the “effects” on the victim, rather it focused
on the conduct of law enforcement) (nevertheless, most lower courts have continued to
follow Stein and require some connection between such force and its effects on a
suspect. Even where force was actually applied by the police, lower courts have held
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techniques can also be found in circumstances where the police
threaten third parties, such as the suspect’s wife, children, etc.106 In
making this determination, which is highly fact specific as to whether
“third degree” tactics were used or whether a promise or threat was
made to induce the confession, the court must look to the “totality of
the circumstances.” Aside from “third degree” tactics, which for
obvious reasons are deeply problematic, the following are of particular
importance in assessing the “totality of the circumstances”:
Another very important consideration is whether the defendant
was subjected to extended periods of incommunicado
interrogation. Of particular significance in this regard is whether
the suspect was subjected to lengthy and uninterrupted
interrogation, whether he was kept in confinement an extended
period of time even though subjected only to intermittent
questioning, whether he was moved from place to place and
questioned by different persons so as to be disoriented, whether he
was questioned in solitary confinement or at some isolated place
away from the jail, whether he was held incommunicado up until
the time of the confession (especially if family, friends or counsel
were turned away), and whether—if the suspect is a foreign
national—there was a violation of his right under treaty to have
consular officials notified of his detention. Under the more
extreme of these circumstances, such as where there have been a
couple of weeks of uninterrupted detention or virtual nonstop
interrogation for 36 hours, the situation is “inherently coercive”
and suppression of the confession is mandated. But when the
circumstances are somewhat less extreme, as where the detention
has only been a few days or the questioning lasted only a few
hours, exclusion of the confession has typically occurred only

that intervening factors may require an examination of the circumstance of the
individual case to determine whether it was that force (and the threat of new force) that
operated to overbear the will of the defendant); see United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d
934, 939 (9th Cir. 1991) (“it appears most likely that Stein’s per se approach is limited
to those confessions made substantially concurrently with physical violence.” A line
must be drawn “between those confessions properly considered to have been made
concurrently with violence, in which a conclusive presumption that one’s will is
overborne is appropriate, and those sufficiently attenuated from such misconduct to
justify application of the more lenient totality of the circumstances test.”); Id. (finding
relevant such factors as the passage in time, change in custodial status, and affirmative
police steps to remove the threat).
106. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961).
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when it was also shown that the defendant was especially
susceptible to coercion. In the case of Bram v. United States, [168
U.S. 532, 542-3 (1897)] the Court declared that a confession
“obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,” is
not voluntary. Read literally, this passage suggests a standard
holding automatically involuntary any confession that was a “but
for” product of a promise that might benefit the defendant. That
position has long been challenged, however, and in Arizona v.
Fulminante, [499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991)] the Supreme Court noted
that such a reading of the Bram passage “under current precedent
does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a
confession.” The role of the promise must be evaluated in light of
the totality of the circumstances and the promise must have been
“sufficiently compelling to overbear the suspect’s will in light of
… [those] circumstances.” [United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847
F.2d 1363, 1367(1988)]107
107. LaFave, supra note 73 (emphasis added). See also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG &
DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND
COMMENTARY, NINTH EDITION, 661-66 (2010) (the Court has made it clear that the test
for “voluntariness” is whether the police conduct at issue was sufficient to overbear the
will of the accused). Florida v. Powell, 595 U.S. 50, 52 (2010); Dickerson v. United
States, 430 U.S. 428, 434 (2000); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984);
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341, 347-48 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 115 (1975); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14
(1966); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 376, 390-91 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 544 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 574, 576, 602 (1961)
(Opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (excellent discussion of the common law background of
the voluntariness test); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (excellent
survey of voluntariness cases by Chief Justice Warren).
To determine if a defendant’s statements were voluntary, a court must ask whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement officials obtained the evidence
by overbearing the will of the accused. This inquiry centers upon: (1) the conduct of
law enforcement officials in creating the pressure, and (2) the suspect’s capacity to
resist that pressure.
Annual Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 GEO. L. J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 187,
208-9 (2012) (emphasis added). As noted previously, in resolving these two factors the
court looks to the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 210-13. In trying to be even
more precise about voluntariness, at least two scholars have suggested the following:
[Joseph D.] Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L.
REV. 859 (1979), argues that an involuntary confession is “any confession produced by
interrogation pressures that a person of reasonable firmness, with some of the
defendant’s characteristics, would not resist.” Others have argued that a confession is
involuntary only where police tactics are such as would force an innocent person to
confess. This is a reflection of the premise of some scholars that “the Constitution
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The prosecution has the burden of establishing the voluntariness of the
confession/custodial statement by a preponderance of the evidence.108
Probable cause is also relevant in the custodial interrogation
context. If a suspect is in custody unlawfully, that is, the suspect is
under full custodial arrest but there is insufficient probable cause to
support the arrest, the confession made under such circumstances will
almost always be suppressed.109 This is true even in the absence of
other circumstances surrounding the confession, including the fact that
the suspect freely and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.110
Unlawful custody/arrest is a near impossible hurdle for the prosecution
to overcome. It renders the confession involuntary under due
process.111 The common law also provided one important additional
protection to those who confessed to crimes. The rule is still followed
in many jurisdictions. The common law required proof of the corpus
delicti of the crime aliunde the confession. This rule is important, as
we shall see later, because it is powerful protection against the
possibility that someone might be convicted solely on the basis of a
false confession.
In general, extrajudicial statements or admissions or confessions
of an accused must be corroborated, in order to be admissible and
to support a conviction. The purpose of the requirement that a
confession be corroborated is to obviate the danger of conviction
on the basis of a confession or admission where no crime has, in
fact, been committed. . . . The corroboration must be established
by evidence independent of the confession or admission. [The
problem] to avoid [is] the danger of convicting a defendant solely
out of his or her own mouth of a crime that never occurred or a

seeks to protect the innocent.” [Akhil Reid] Amar, The CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES, 154 (1997). This would mean that threats of harm, and
physical violence would be prohibited, but tactics that could be used to trick a person
to confess (e.g., false expressions of sympathy, or understating the significance of the
crime) would be permitted.
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG AND DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND COMMENTARY, NINTH EDITION, 661 (2010). See generally
JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993).
108. See sources cited supra note 91.
109. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2009); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626
(2003) (per curiam) (Miranda warnings insufficient to break the taint of illegal arrest);
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979);
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
110. See sources cited supra note 110.
111. See sources cited supra note 110.
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crime committed by someone else . . .112

Therefore, under the common law, even if a confession is clearly
voluntary, it is insufficient without corroborating evidence to support a
conviction.
However, as noted above, police conduct, including
misrepresentations and trickery, which does not rise to this level –
“third degree” or a “promise” or a “threat” – has not been held to
invalidate a confession.
In addition to being voluntary under the due process test, a
confession/custodial statement must pass muster under Miranda v.
Arizona.113 I do not intend to explain Miranda in any detail. It is not
necessary to do so here. Miranda requires that suspects be given their
Miranda rights114 when they are in “custody” and subject to
“interrogation” or its functional equivalent.115 Police must obtain a
“waiver” before beginning an interrogation. The waiver must not only
be voluntary as discussed above, but knowing and intelligent as well. 116
Miranda requires an actual waiver of rights; due process voluntariness
is not enough.117 After a waiver is secured, questioning may proceed. If
there is no waiver, questioning is not permitted. If the suspect is
112. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1288-89 (2013). Accord 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 1395-96 (2013).
113. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114. The so-called “Miranda rights” have never been given precise form by the
Court. This comes as a surprise to many people. The Court has actually never required
any particular verbiage be used, only that the basic rights be expressed clearly. Florida
v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204-5 (2010); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203-4
(1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1981). Annual Review, Custodial
Interrogations, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 187 (2012) (Suspects must be
warned of their rights to remain silent, that any statements can be used against them at
trial, that they have a right to the presence of an attorney at questioning, and if they
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for them for free. This is the essence of
Miranda).
115. See sources cited supra note 114. See also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct.
2394 (2011) (“custody”); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (per curiam);
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (“interrogation”); Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420 (1984) (“custody”); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983)
(“custody”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (“interrogation”); Annual
Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 187, 188-196
(2012).
116. See sources cited supra note 111; Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250
(2010). See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986) (making it clear
that the standard for a waiver of Miranda rights is the same as the due process
voluntariness standard discussed at length above).
117. See sources cited supra note 115.
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questioned in the absence of a waiver of Miranda rights, the statement
may not be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.118
The procedures set forth in Jackson v. Denno119 are required
before the jury hears a custodial statement. Upon motion by defense
counsel, a hearing is held before the court in the absence of the jury to
determine whether the voluntariness due process standard was met and
that the requirements of Miranda were followed.120 The prosecution
has the burden of proof before the court, by a preponderance of the
evidence, to establish voluntariness and a knowing and intelligent
waiver of Miranda rights.121 If the court finds the confession voluntary
and that Miranda was properly waived, the confession then goes to the
jury, that is, it may be considered by the trier of fact to determine guilt
or innocence.122 Juveniles are generally subject to the same rules as
adults concerning due process voluntariness and the waiver of their
Miranda rights.123 The Miranda warnings need not be videotaped or in
writing, and the oral testimony of an officer that the accused received
the warnings and waived them freely and voluntarily is sufficient.124
While some courts have allowed expert testimony on the issue of
voluntariness, at best this is a contested issue. It appears that most
courts have not looked with favor on expert testimony in this
context.125
118. See sources cited supra note 115. But see Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 723-4
(1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (statements made in violation of
Miranda may still be used for impeachment purposes.. Also, the police may make
derivative use of a statement taken merely in violation of Miranda). United States v.
Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (if a statement is truly involuntary under due process, the
best view seems to be that it cannot be used for impeachment and any evidence seized
derivatively may also be suppressed). WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 9.5(a) (3d ed., 2012) (a statement can be totally voluntary,
and yet be in technical violation of Miranda. However, the reverse is hard to
contemplate. Mere Miranda violations to not warrant the same severe response as do
due process voluntariness violations).
119. See sources cited supra note 95.
120. See sources cited supra note 95.
121. See sources cited supra note 95.
122. See sources cited supra note 95.
123. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (holding that voluntariness and waiver
standards for juveniles and adults are the same, but age is an important factor court
must consider); See also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding in
determining “custody” for Miranda purposes, a court must consider age of suspect).
124. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 6.8(c) (3d
ed., 2012).
125. Solomon M. Fulero, Tales From the Front: Expert Testimony on the
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It should be noted that the mere fact that a suspect is suffering
from some serious mental disease or defect, without more, is not a
basis for excluding a confession.126 Due process and the Self
Incrimination Clause, as well as the Bill of Rights generally, require
some kind of police or governmental misconduct or overreaching.127
The purpose of due process, the privilege against self-incrimination,
and the Bill of Rights in general is to protect one from governmental
misconduct, not one’s own misfortune, condition, or the conduct of
non-state actors, that is, private parties.128 In other words, “a state actor
is a necessary element to [find a confession involuntary under] this
test.”129
Lastly, some jurisdictions enforce the procedure outlined above in
slightly different ways. Some background is required. When the
Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions Revisited, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND
FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
211-224 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) (mixed results and
few published cases permitting this kind of testimony); I. Bruce Frumkin, Evaluations
of Competency to Waive Miranda Rights and Coerced or False Confessions: Common
Pitfalls in Expert Testimony, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS:
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 202-6 (G. Daniel
Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) (disallowing expert testimony in most
cases regarding competency to waive Miranda); FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 367-78 (5th ed. 2013); New Decisions, John E. Reid
&
Associates,
Inc.
(collecting
cases),
https://www.reid.com/educational_info/r_ccorner.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2013);
Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, A Three Dimensional Model for the Use of Expert
Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False Confession Defenses Before the Trier
of Fact, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 783 (2003); Saul M. Kassin and Gisli H. Gudjonsson,
The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI.
PUB. INT. 33, 58-9 (2004) (arguing for the use of expert testimony). Id. at 59 (stating
that “psychologists have testified in hundreds of criminal trials that generated no
written opinions.”). Id. (noting “yet, in other cases they have been excluded on various
grounds.”). Id. (citing no case where an expert was allowed to testify as to the veracity
of a confession). See also Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science
Community, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward,
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY (discussing problems in forensic
science lately) (There have been serious issues raised about the validity of the science
behind some “forensic science” in recent years. If either the prosecution or the defense
offers expert testimony on this issue, it must be based on solid science) (Sept. 27, 2013,
10:00 PM), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.
126. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Annual Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.,
187, 209 (2012). See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170.
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Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Denno,130 there were three methods
governing the admissibility of confessions: the orthodox rule, the
Massachusetts rule, and the New York rule.131 In those states following
the orthodox rule, the judge determined the issue of voluntariness. The
jury did not make a separate determination of that issue. The jury could
hear evidence regarding police methods in acquiring the confession to
determine the weight to be given to the confession, that is, its
credibility. However, the jury in no circumstances was asked to pass on
its voluntariness separate and apart from the judge’s finding.132 Under
the Massachusetts rule, the finding of voluntariness is bifurcated. First,
the trial judge ruled on the issue of voluntariness. If the court found the
confession involuntary, the confession was suppressed and that was the
end of the matter. However, if the judge found the confession
voluntary, it was then submitted to the jury and they were charged to
make an independent determination of voluntariness before
considering the confession as evidence of guilt. The jury was permitted
to hear extensive evidence on the voluntariness of the confession, that
is, the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the taking of the
confession as referenced above.133 Under the New York rule, the
determination of the voluntariness of the confession was primarily left
up to the jury. The judge’s role under the New York rule was limited to
excluding the confession only if there were “no circumstances” under
which the confession could be voluntary.134 The jury was then charged
on the voluntariness standard and told to consider the confession only
if it found the confession to be voluntary.135 In Jackson v. Denno, the
Supreme Court found the New York rule to be unconstitutional by a
vote of 5-4. The essence of the Court’s holding in Jackson was
succinctly summarized by the Court in the later case of Lego v.
Twomey.136 In Lego, the Court held:
We concluded that the New York procedure was constitutionally
defective because at no point along the way did a criminal
defendant receive a clear-cut determination that the confession

130.
131.
2012).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Wayne R. LaFave, et al., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 10.5(a) (3d ed.,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
404 U.S. 477, 483 (1972).
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used against him was in fact voluntary. The trial judge was not
entitled to exclude a confession merely because he himself would
have found it involuntary, and, while we recognized that the jury
was empowered to perform that function, we doubted it could do
so reliably. Precisely because confessions of guilt, whether
coerced or freely given, may be truthful and potent evidence, we
did not believe a jury could be called upon to ignore the probative
value of a truthful but coerced confession; it was also likely, we
thought, that in judging voluntariness itself the jury would be
influenced by the reliability of a confession it considered an
accurate account of the facts.137

Also noted in Lego, the Court in Jackson “cast no doubt upon the
orthodox and Massachusetts procedures.”138
It is important to note that the Massachusetts rule and the
orthodox rule survive today in various incarnations in many state
jurisdictions: “The dozen or so states which had theretofore used the
New York procedure were thus free to adopt either of the others. The
orthodox rule is now followed in the federal courts and in most states,
while a substantial minority uses the Massachusetts rule.”139 A practical
example of the Massachusetts rule is superbly evidenced in State v.
Parker.140 There the Court noted that after the judge determines
voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury must be
instructed that before it may consider the confession on the issue of
guilt or innocence, it must first find the confession voluntary beyond a
reasonable doubt.141 The jury is entitled to hear all relevant evidence of
the confession’s voluntariness.142
This, then, is the procedure governing the admissibility of
confessions. This is the current state of the law. It is tedious and
thorough. However, it is often not followed with the necessary
meticulousness, and this is the problem. I will return later with a
137. Id.
138. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 10.5(a) (3d
ed., 2012) (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 481 n. 3 (1972)).
139. Id. See also E. H. Schlopler, Annotation, Comment Note: Constitutional Aspects
of Procedure for Determining Voluntariness of Pretrial Confession, 1 A.L.R. 3d 1251
(2013); William G. Phelps, Annotation, Duty of Court, in Federal Criminal
Prosecution, to Conduct Inquiry Into Voluntariness of Accused’s Statement—Modern
Cases, 132 A.L.R. Fed. 415 (2010).
140. 671 S.E.2d 619, 622, 627-30 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
141. Id. at 622.
142. Id. See also LaFave, et al., supra note 128.
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recommendation on how to fix this, but first it is necessary to leave the
law, strictly speaking, and address the social science of interrogation.
V. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Earlier in this article, I paraphrased and tweaked Mark Twain’s
famous quote: I said that the three kinds of lies are lies, damn lies, and
police interrogations.143 We have discussed that at length. However, it
is now time to note the original quote again: “There are three kinds of
lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics.”144 In Mark Twain’s time, there was
no such thing as social science research, at least, not anything that
would be seriously recognized as such in the modern sense. However,
“statistics,” or better yet a certain statistical frame of mind, is surely
what Mark Twain was thinking about when he said this. It is the
mindset of many who oppose certain police interrogation techniques.
As The New Yorker has recently informed us with respect to certain
interrogation techniques, “Here, too, social scientists find reason for
concern.”145 It is fair to inquire into the reliability of police methods.
That is an inquiry we should never stop making. However, it is also
fair to inquire into the reliability of the methods of those who oppose
the police and the great weight of legal precedent on this matter. Thus
far, they have failed to make a real impact on courts, as I have shown
above.146 Are the courts at fault for missing something? Perhaps, in
looking more closely at the data, that is, “statistics,” as well as the socalled “research,” the courts have realized that the common law struck
the right balance all along.
There is a substantial literature on this subject. Not all of it is of
equal value. Currently, the most valuable and concise statement of the
issues, law, and “science” surrounding this subject matter can be found
in four works: (1) POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE,
by Richard A. Leo; (2) POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE
CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS, eds. G. Daniel Lassiter and Christian A.
143. See Twain supra note 4.
144. Id. It turns out there is a substantial literature on the misuse of statistical data
and the like. See JOEL BEST, DAMNED LIES AND STATISTICS: UNTANGLING NUMBERS
FROM THE MEDIA, POLITICIANS, AND ACTIVISTS (2001); JOEL BEST, MORE DAMNED LIES
AND STATISTICS: HOW NUMBERS CONFUSE PUBLIC ISSUES (2004); JOEL BEST, STATSPOTTING: A FIELD GUIDE TO IDENTIFYING DUBIOUS DATA (2008); DARRELL HUFF,
HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS (1993). Mark Twain would be proud. He was right!
145. See Starr, supra note 14, at 45.
146. See LaFave et al., supra note 125.
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Meissner; (3) CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 5TH ED.,
by Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, Joseph P. Buckley, and Brian C. Jayne,
and (4) an excellent summary of the social scientific research is
presented in The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the
Literature and Issues by Saul M. Kassin and Gisli H. Gudjonsson.147
The studies in question vary greatly in their methods and mode of
analysis. For my purposes, I break them down as follows: DNA and
physical evidence based studies, self reporting studies based on
interviews of suspects and police investigators about their conduct
during alleged interrogations, observational studies where an alleged
independent expert/observer actually observed interviews, and lastly,
controlled “lab” studies where individuals—often college students—
are engaged in mock scenarios that supposedly allow us to draw
conclusions about the behavior of real police and suspects in an actual
interrogation.148 DNA and physical evidence based studies usually
147. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008);
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE,
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds.,
2012); FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (5th ed.
2013). See also THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited
Feb. 3, 2014); John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., http://www.reid.com (last visited Sept.
21, 2013). As noted above, the literature is voluminous. However, there is some
additional important literature. See Gisli H. Gudjonsson, False Confessions and
Correcting Injustices, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 689 (2012); Yale Kamisar, The Rise,
Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965 (2012); Mary D. Fan, The
Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 U.S. DAVIS L. REV. 1407
(2011); Russell L. Weaver, Reliability, Justice and Confessions: The Essential
Paradox, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179 (2010); Saul M. Kassin, et. al., Police-Induced
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010);
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051
(2010); Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: Why Innocent People Confess, 32 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 525 (2009); Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the
Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 551 (2007); Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy:
Miranda is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579
(2007); George C. Thomas, III, “Truth Machines” and Confession Law in the Year
2046, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215 (2007); Dale E. Ives, Preventing False Confessions:
Is Oickle Up to the Task?, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 477 (2007); Saul M. Kassin and Gisli
H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues,
5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33 (2004); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation
Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168 (2001); Joseph D. Grano,
Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern
Confessions Law, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1465 (1999); Welsh S. White, What
is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998).
148. These types of studies are all addressed in the literature. See Saul M. Kassin &
Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and
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involve a situation where a suspect who confessed was later shown to
be innocent because physical evidence or DNA analysis proved that the
suspect simply could not have committed the crime.149 Self-reporting
studies are either done in person (by an interviewer) or in writing (on
computer or via mail). Participants in the studies are asked a series of
questions about why they confessed or, if the person is a police officer,
what they believe about the interrogation process. Inferences are then
drawn from these interviews by social scientists.150 Observational
studies should be obvious enough. Suspects and interviewers are
observed by independent observers who analyze the situations they are
watching.151 Lastly, the controlled mock scenarios are the most
interesting. Some are cleverly, but questionably, designed. Usually, but
not always, college students are involved. They are engaged in clever
mock scenarios from which it is thought data can be extrapolated that
has relevance for the real world of police interrogations.
Students/participants are placed in scenarios where they are engaged in
some activity and are told to lie about it, or are accused of wrong doing
when they did nothing wrong. Attempts are then made to get them to
falsely confess.152
At the outset, there are a few points worthy of special note. It is
absolutely clear that false confessions are a reality. We really do know
that some innocent people admit to things they did not do, and some

Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 38-56 (2004); POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND
FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012) (various essays of this
anthology address all four of the studies as I have broken them down); RICHARD A.
LEO, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, 195-236 (2008); Saul M.
Kassin, et. al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 3-28 (2010).
149. Saul M. Kassin, et. al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 3 (2010).
150. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A
Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 38-56 (2004);
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE,
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds.,
2012).
151. See sources cited supra note 149.
152. See sources cited supra note 149. See also Christian A. Meissner, Melissa B.
Russano & Fadia M. Narchet, The Importance of a Laboratory Science for Improving
the Diagnostic Value of Confession Evidence, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE
CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G.
Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012).
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guilty people will admit to more than they actually did.153 Second, there
is no clear theory, at least no front-runner in modern social science
literature, as to why people do this. It appears there are nearly as many
theories as researchers.154 Third, and last, the rate of false confessions
is unknown.155 This later point is absolutely crucial in determining how
to address the alleged false confession problem.
However, there is perennial debate about the incidence rate of
false confessions, with some scholars seeking to calculate
estimates [citations omitted], and others maintaining that accurate
incidence rates cannot be derived [citation omitted].156

In a recent work, the matter is put this way by “one of the most
renowned experts on the psychology of interrogations and
confessions:”157
The frequency with which false confessions occur during
interrogation in different countries is unknown. However, it is
documented from anecdotal case histories and research on
miscarriages of justice that false confessions do sometimes occur
[citations omitted]. Kassin and Gudjonsson (2004)[158]
commented: “As no one knows the frequency of false confessions
or has devised an adequate method of calculating precise incident

153. Kassin & Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the
Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 46-56 (2004); RICHARD A. LEO,
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, 195-236 (2008); Gisli H.
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False Confessions: A Review of the Current Evidence,
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE,
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 31-48 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner
eds., 2012). See also FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS, 339-377 (5th ed. 2013).
154. See sources cited supra note 149.
155. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False Confessions: A Review of the
Current Evidence, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 31-48 (G. Daniel Lassiter &
Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012); Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The
Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI.
PUB. INT. 33, 44 (2004).
156. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A
Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 44, 48-49 (2004).
157. G. Daniel Lassiter, et. al., Introduction: Police Interrogations and False
Confessions – An Overview, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS:
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 4 (G. Daniel Lassiter
& Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012).
158. See sources cited supra note 148.
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rates, there is perennial debate over the numbers” (p. 48).[159] The
problem with high-profile cases is that they undoubtedly represent
only the tip of the iceberg and focus primarily on the most serious
cases, such as murder, rape, and terrorism [citation omitted].
There is evidence from self-reported studies conducted among
prisoners [citation omitted], young persons [citation omitted], and
those with mental disorders [citation omitted]. Experimental
studies [citation omitted] using the classic Alt key paradigm[160]
introduced by Kassin and Kiechel (1996) have shown that false
confessions can be readily elicited by false accusations,
psychological manipulation, and interrogative pressure [citation
omitted].161

So, this is the latest from the social science front?162 This conclusion
hardly instills confidence in the social science of false confessions.
Studies of the kind referenced in the immediately preceding quote were
all discussed at length in the 2004 article I referenced earlier.163
Nothing is new. It is time to take a close look at the kinds of studies
relied on to justify this highly qualified and lukewarm conclusion. I
mentioned them earlier. To repeat, the studies fall into four general
categories: DNA and physical evidence studies, self-reporting studies,
observational studies, and mock scenario studies.
These studies are ably discussed in Kassin and Gudjonsson’s
2004 article, which I have already referenced.164 First, a mock scenario
type test was done to determine “investigator response bias.”165 The
159. See sources cited supra note 148.
160. This refers to one of the mock scenarios using mostly college students that I
will return to shortly. Also, the reference to “Alt key” is a reference to the “Alt” key on
a typical computer key board. It is so named because the “test” involves students
striking certain keys on a key board in response to certain prompts.
161. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False Confessions: A Review of the
Current Evidence, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 36 (G. Daniel Lassiter &
Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012) (emphasis added).
162. See sources cited supra note 142. See also Christian A. Meissner, Melissa B.
Russano, & Fadia M. Narchet, The Importance of a Laboratory Science for Improving
the Diagnostic Value of Confession Evidence, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE
CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G.
Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012) (not many new kinds of studies
since the 2004 article, the studies seem to be basically of the same kind).
163. See Kassin & Gudjonsson supra note 157.
164. See sources cited supra note 148.
165. See sources cited supra note 148.
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entire test involved a relatively small group of less than 100 people.
About half were students and half were “real, experienced
investigators.”166 Some were trained in the “Reid technique,” though it
appears this was done by assigning the Reid manual for reading and
watching a few “Reid technique” videotapes.167 There is no claim that
the “Reid technique” was taught by persons approved by John E. Reid
& Associates or other qualified professionals.168 Apparently, the
participants were told to watch videos of people being interrogated and
asked to determine whether the person in the video was deceptive
regarding the “mock crime” in question.169 In the end, it was
determined that the observers were biased “toward seeing deception”
and that training in the “Reid technique” made them more biased.170 It
seems that similar tests have been done by others.171
Another test of the mock scenario sort set out to show that when
confronted with false evidence, some participants tended “to
internalize responsibility for that act, and to confabulate details
consistent with that belief.”172 This is the now famous Alt key test,
previously referenced.173
In the first such study, Kassin and Kiechel (1996) tested the
hypothesis that the presentation of false evidence can lead
individuals who are rendered vulnerable to confess to a prohibited
act they did not commit, to internalize responsibility for that act,
and to confabulate details consistent with that belief. In this
experiment, subjects typed letters on a keyboard in what was
supposed to be a reaction time study. They were then accused of
causing the experimenter’s computer to crash by pressing a key
they were instructed to avoid—at which point they were asked to
sign a confession. All subjects were innocent, and all initially
denied the charge. Two factors were independently varied. First,
the subject’s vulnerability was manipulated by varying the pace of
the task, fast or slow. Second, the presentation of false evidence
was manipulated by having a confederate tell the experimenter

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See sources cited supra note 148.
See sources cited supra note 148.
See sources cited supra note 148.
See sources cited supra note 148.
See sources cited supra note 148.
See sources cited supra note 148.
See sources cited supra note 148.
See Gudjonsson, supra note 162.
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either that she did or that she did not witness the subject hit the
forbidden key. Three levels of influence were assessed. To elicit
compliance, the experimenter handwrote a confession and asked
subjects to sign it. To measure internalization, he secretly taperecorded whether subjects took responsibility when they later
described the experience to a waiting subject, actually a second
confederate (e.g., ‘‘I hit a key I wasn’t supposed to and ruined the
program’’). To measure confabulation, the experimenter brought
subjects back into the lab and asked if they could reconstruct what
happened to see if they would manufacture details (e.g., ‘‘yes,
here, I hit it with the side of my hand right after you called out the
‘A’ ‘‘). Overall, 69% of all subjects signed the confession, 28%
internalized guilt, and 9% confabulated details to support their
false beliefs (see Table 5). More important were the effects of the
independent variables. In the baseline condition, when the pace
was slow and there was no witness, 35% of subjects signed the
note—but not a single one exhibited internalization or
confabulation. In contrast, when the pace was fast and there was
allegedly a witness, all subjects signed the confession, 65%
internalized guilt, and 35% concocted supportive details. Clearly,
people can be induced to confess and to internalize guilt for an
outcome they did not produce —and this risk is increased by the
presentation of false evidence, a trick often used by police and
sanctioned by the courts. Follow-up studies using this computercrash paradigm have replicated and extended the false-evidence
effect.174

What are we to make of such tests, this “science?” First, we should
note that “[t]he interrogation room certainly presents a challenge to
laboratory researchers who attempt to recreate the elements of police
interrogation in a controlled environment.”175 “[I]t is impossible to
precisely replicate the circumstances that a criminal suspect faces
during interrogation.”176 So, how well have they been replicated here,
in these two texts? I think not too well. Students and others involved in
174. Id. at 54. See also Christian A. Meissner, Melissa B. Russano, and Fadia M.
Narchet, The Importance of a Laboratory Science for Improving the Diagnostic Value
of Confession Evidence, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 118-9 (G. Daniel Lassiter &
Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012).
175. See Meissner, supra note 175, at 118.
176. Id.
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a social science professor’s experiment surely know the stakes are not
high for them. Nothing really bad is going to go wrong, it cannot. A
real innocent person is not going to lose his/her life or liberty. A
violent criminal will not go free if the participants made a wrong
decision. This is a controlled experiment. Nothing during such an
experiment can cause one to lose one’s life or liberty for years to come.
There will be no permanent social stigma based on what happens at
such an event. Students in such an experiment surely know what the
professor knows about such events, “[e]thical constraints likely always
preclude researchers from creating situations in which participants
believe they are under suspicion and are being interrogated for an
actual criminal act.”177 When students show up for school in the
morning, they know—barring some incredible unforeseen event—they
will be going home at the end of the day. I submit that is not how
suspects or police view the interrogation room. Suspects are more
likely to know they will leave if they convince the police they are
innocent, not if they confess to a crime.
What of the first mock scenario text I mentioned, the test
concerning interrogation bias. What does it really prove? A few
students read a manual and watch videos of people who they are told
have committed a crime. Is this really the typical police station? Is this
really like interrogation at all? These are not the kinds of data that
would justify a court in abandoning well-established common law
principles of law and evidence. One researcher has this to say of the
mock scenario tests:
Experimental research is particularly helpful in studying the
conditions under which people make false confessions and allow
the researcher to control for ground truth, but this kind of research
has little ecological validity in terms of applying it to real-life
individual cases.178

An additional point must be made regarding “investigator
response bias.” As was noted earlier, most of the issues raised by
critics pertain to custodial interrogations. Police must have full
probable cause in order to have someone in custody before an

177. Id.
178. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False Confessions: A Review of the
Current Evidence, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 43 (G. Daniel Lassiter &
Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012).
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interrogation even begins.179 This is a factor totally ignored by many of
the social science “tests” and criticisms that police presume suspects
are guilty during questioning. So, how does this work to protect the
innocent and justify police suspicions toward those in custody?
There is no question that deceptive interrogation techniques can
contribute to the unpleasantness that suspects, both guilty and
innocent, endure during interrogation. Nevertheless, once there is
probable cause to suspect a person of a crime, some level of
discomfort is considered acceptable because of society’s interest
in investigating and solving crimes. Deceptive but nonthreatening
interrogation will generally be no more unpleasant than the other
intrusions deemed reasonable after a showing of probable cause–
such as having one’s home thoroughly searched pursuant to a
warrant, or being placed in a detention facility during post-arrest
processing. The probable cause standard provides an appropriate
threshold of protection from both the pressures of custodial
interrogation and the unpleasantness of deceptive interrogation
techniques.180

The so-called self-reporting studies are not better. One significant
study involves self-reporting of inmates in Iceland and Northern
Ireland.181 The inmates were asked a series of questions, such as, “did
you confess because of police pressure during the interview?” “Are
you now pleased that you confessed?” “Do you now regret having
confessed?” “Did you confess because you were frightened of the
police?” “Did you feel you wanted to get it off your chest?” And, so on
. . .182 The self serving nature of all of this is simply overwhelming.
One feels compelled to ask: “What did you expect them to say?” One
scholar has noted:
In many anecdotal case studies, ground truth is difficult to

179. See sources cited supra note 110.
180. Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is too Far?,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1210 (2001). (indicating the same rationale would work for
Terry stops). Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). What probable cause does for the
police and the accused in the arrest context, reasonable suspicion should do in the
Terry stop context. Thus, the Fourth Amendment functions to guarantee reasonable
behavior on the part of the police in the vast majority of situations where serious
questioning takes place.
181. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A
Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 33, 47-8 (2004).
182. Id. at 47
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ascertain [citation omitted]. Similarly, in studies of false
confessions among prisoners and community samples, the
genuineness of the false confession is nearly impossible to
corroborate.183

This would seem to hold for all the self-reporting studies.
Observational studies have their own unique problems. Does the
observer have a bias? How much experience does the observer have in
police interrogation? Do the participants to the interrogation know they
are being observed?184 While observers can reduce the likelihood of
improper tactics by their presence, as long as the tactics are lawful it is
hard to see what a mere observer can do. The observer could see
whether a particular tactic was successful, but not whether it was fair
or reliable. As noted many times above, police admit to using tricks
and misrepresentation techniques during interrogation. Courts have
approved it. We know what police actually do and can do in the
interrogation room. That is not the debate. The debate is about whether
what police actually do is fair and whether it produces reliable
confessions.
Lastly, there is the DNA and physical evidence. This is somewhat
obvious. DNA evidence can, at times, be retested. New physical
evidence turns up which conclusively proves that the defendant simply
could not be the perpetrator.185
In about 25% of DNA exoneration cases, innocent defendants
made incriminating statements, delivered outright confessions or
pled guilty.186

According to the Innocence Project, as of September 2013, there have
183. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False Confessions: A Review of the
Current Evidence, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 43 (G. Daniel Lassiter &
Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012).
184. Id. at 46. See also Ray Bull & Stavroula Soukara, Four Studies of What Really
Happens in Police Interviews, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS:
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 81-96 (G. Daniel
Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012).
185. Richard A. Leo & Steven A. Drizin, The Three Errors: Pathways to False
Confession and Wrongful Conviction, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE
CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G.
Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012); RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE
INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, 237-268 (2008).
186. Understand the Causes: False Confessions, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Feb.
3, 2014).
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been “312 post-conviction DNA exonerations in United States
history.”187
What does this mean? I shall take the Innocence Project claims at
face value. First, it is a tragedy for anyone to be wrongfully convicted.
However, these statistics must be put in perspective. This means, at
best, we know that approximately 78 people have been wrongfully
convicted where false confessions were also involved.188 We know the
confessions in these cases were false, because DNA evidence proved
that the offenders in question did not commit the crimes.189 However,
what can we extrapolate from these statistics? Not much.190 The FBI
maintains the Uniform Crime Reports. These are the gold standard
when it comes to criminal statistics in the United States. In 2011 (the
crime statistics are not complete for 2012 as of this writing), law
enforcement made a staggering 12,408,899 arrests in the United States.
Of these, 1,639,883 were for property crimes and 534,704 were for
violent crimes.191 In 2011 approximately 1,598,780 people were
incarcerated for crimes in federal and state institutions.192 Keep in mind
this is only for 2011, not for all of “United States history.”193 Anyone
can do the mathematical extrapolations from here. Keep in mind we
really do not know how many innocent people have been convicted.
We only know for sure that the number is most likely infinitesimally
small. Aside from hard DNA evidence, and some other forms of
physical evidence, we do not have any way to calculate with certainty
the number of innocents convicted throughout U.S. history.194 We
certainly do not know the current rate of conviction for innocents,195
other than that it too is likely to be infinitesimally small. It is easy to
quote Blackstone who said “better than 10 guilty persons escape, than

187. Home page, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (emphasis added).
188. See sources cited supra note 186.
189. See sources cited supra note 186.
190. Why not much? See Gudjonsson supra note 162.
191. Crime in the United States 2011, FBI NATIONAL INCIDENT BASED REPORTING
SYSTEM, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/2011 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
192. E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4559 (last visited Sept. 29
2013).
193. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 182.
194. See Gudjonsson supra note 162.
195. See Gudjonsson supra note 162.
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that one innocent suffer.”196 However, we do not behave as if this were
true, and we should not, we cannot.197 Even if the Innocence Project is
correct in every way, it appears our error rate is very low, though it is
not, and surely never will be, zero.
What about the methodologies referenced above? As noted
previously, I have divided the studies into four types: DNA and
physical evidence based studies, self reporting studies based on
interviews of suspects and police investigators about their conduct
during alleged interrogations, observational studies where an alleged
independent expert/observer actually observed interviews, and lastly,
controlled “lab” studies where individuals—often college students—
are engaged in mock scenarios that supposedly allow us to draw
conclusions about the behavior of real police and suspects in an actual
interrogation. I have addressed the first. DNA and physical evidence is
truly hard science. The other three are not. While this is not the place
for an in-depth discussion of social science theory and modeling, some
basic problems are obvious in the false confession research. The cases
analyzed by the Registry and the Innocence Project were not based on
random selection, and suffer from severe problems regarding
“selection bias.”198 In fairness, those who maintain the Registry and the
Innocence Project are not social scientists whose main goal is to do
research. They are advocacy groups who represent incarcerated
defendants in and effort to achieve justice. However, as their cases do
not represent a “scientific” sample, we cannot make statements about
the rate of false convictions, especially those based on alleged false
confessions. The interviews of prisoners and others done by some of
the social scientists hardly past muster as good scientific evidence. In
many cases the samples are small and limited. Inadequate sample size
196. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 352
(Clarendon Press ed. 1769).
197. See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY, 63-88, 171-193-212 (Cambridge 2006); Larry Laudan, Is It Finally
Time to Put ‘Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’ Out to Pasture? 9-24 (Univ. of Tex.
Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 194, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1815321. Simple
mathematic extrapolations will show that the error rate, at best, is far, far less than 1 in
10. It is less than 1 in 100, and less than 1 in 1000. There will always be some error
rate, an error free criminal justice system is not a remote reality. In addition, there are
real and substantial social costs for any system, like ours, which already falsely acquits
or doesn’t apprehend a great many offenders.
198. GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL
INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH, 115-149 (1994)
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is in itself a major issue in reliable social science.199 Personal
interviews of prisoners, questionnaires to inmates, and tests like the Alt
key do not give us a scientific picture of the problem of false
confessions.
I would also note the National Registry of Exonerations.200 The
Registry is a source of information frequently used as a database by
those who wish to find evidence to oppose police deception in
interrogation. According to the Registry, there have been 1,304
exonerations since 1989.201 Two major reports have been issued
concerning exonerations by the Registry.202 First, what does the
Registry mean by “exoneration”?
It means a defendant who was convicted of a crime was later
relieved of all legal consequences of that conviction through a
decision by a prosecutor, a governor or a court, after new evidence
of his or her innocence was discovered.203

Of course, “exoneration” is not the same as factual innocence.

We do not claim to be able to determine the guilty or innocence of
convicted defendants. In difficult cases, nobody can do that
reliably. . . . For our purposes, the best we can do is rely on the
actions of those who have the authority to determine a defendant’s
legal guilt.204

According to the Registry, why do innocent defendants confess?

The primary reason that innocent defendants confess is that they
are coerced into doing so – frightened, tricked, exhausted or all
three. Sixty percent of the confessions we located were clearly
coerced. An additional 12% of defendants denied making the

199. Id. at 208-230.
200. THE
NATIONAL
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 3,
2014).
201. Id.
202. Exonerations in the United States 1989-2012, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_201
2_full_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). See also Exonerations in 2013, THE
NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2013_Rep
ort.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
203. See Exonerations supra note 201.
204. Id. at 6.
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confessions that were attributed to them or denied that what they
said was meant as an admission of guilt. Eleven percent of the
confessions appear to have been voluntary. As the 2003 Report
noted, “False confessions don’t come cheap.” They usually
require long, grueling interrogations, sometimes stretching
over days.205

Since my focus is false confessions, what percentage of the Registry’s
“exonerations” are attributable to false confessions? That is, in how
many “exonerations” was an allegedly false confession admitted or
used to obtain a conviction? The answer is 15%.206 In calendar year
2013, it was 12%. False confession is the lowest ranking contributing
205. Id. at 57-8 (emphasis added). One prominent scholar has concurred in his own
analysis of the cases. That is, most of the false confessions are, in fact, “coerced”
confessions. Regarding the exonerees, Professor Garrett studied, he had this to say:
All of these exonerees waived their Miranda rights. All lacked counsel before
confessing. Most were vulnerable juveniles or mentally disabled individuals. Most
were subjected to long and sometimes highly coercive interrogations.
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051, 1058
(2010).
Social scientists have long documented how pressure combined with repetition of a
crime narrative may cause the suspect to internalize that narrative and repeat it,
possibly becoming convinced of his own guilt. Only recently, however, have actual
instances of such false confessions been documented. Pressures brought to bear on
these exonerees ranged from threats combined with offers of leniency, to threats of
physical force. Many described harrowing interrogations lasting many hours or days.
Several described verbal or physical abuse.
Id. at 1064. Interestingly, regarding the Reid Technique, Professor Garrett comments
as follows:
Indeed, police have long known that suspects may admit to crimes that they did not
commit for a range of reasons, including mental illness, desire for attention, desire to
protect loved ones, or others. The Inbau and Reid manual cautions that “[t]he
truthfulness of a confession should be questioned, however, when the suspect is unable
to provide any corroboration beyond the statement, ‘I did it.”’ Further, police are
trained not to leak facts. Police black out certain key information so that the public
does not learn of it during the investigation. Thus, Inbau and Reid advise that, “When
developing corroborative information, the investigator must be certain that the details
were not somehow revealed to the suspect through the questioning process, news
media, or the viewing of crime scene photographs.” Police also know how important it
is to document their efforts to keep certain facts confidential, because doing so later
enhances the power of the confession in a subsequent prosecution or trial. Inbau and
Reid recommend documenting in the case file the facts that are to be kept confidential
“so that all investigators are aware of what information will be withheld.”
Id. at 1067-68 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Reid Technique seems to have
some virtue after all.
206. Id. at 40.
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factor according to the Registry.207 Once again, in light of overall
convictions for the same time period, and taking the statistics at face
value, we are dealing with infinitesimally small numbers.208 In
addition, the fact that so many alleged false confession cases really do
seem to involve coercion means that it was likely genuine coercion and
not mere deception that made the difference. This is no small point
given the analysis so far. I have argued that certain types of deception
are permissible. However, I have steadfastly maintained that coercion
in all forms under the due process voluntariness test voids confession
and should continue to do so. We simply cannot equate deception and
coercion. The courts do not do this, but this confusion continues to
appear in discussions of Registry cases and Innocence project cases.
What do we make of all these numbers? Well, “there are three
kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and . . .” I’m sorry; I digress.
VI. CONCLUSION
The arguments against many forms of police deception in the
interrogation room fail. The social science is not in a position to
overturn long-standing, traditional common law rules that have
prevailed in virtually every court to consider the issue, including the
United States Supreme Court.
Interrogation techniques have changed little in the years since the
Miranda Court itemized them, cast a disapproving look, but
concluded that they were permissible as long as a valid waiver of
rights was obtained. . . . But Miranda left [] interrogators with a
wide berth for obtaining truthful confessions. A compelling
argument has not yet been made that drastic limits on the use of
deceptive interrogation techniques are either required or advisable.
. . . There is nothing wrong with obtaining a truthful confession of
wrongdoing from a guilty person. Reliability, however, is an
appropriate concern. Interrogation techniques must be limited
when they endanger reliability by creating a likelihood of
producing a false confession. In advocating limits on deceptive
techniques, however, some commentators have overstated the
false confession problem and minimized the costs of limiting
interrogation. . . . On the other hand, broad limits on deception
could result in the loss of many thousands of confessions by guilty

207. See Exonerations supra note 201.
208. See FBI supra note 192; Carson & Sabol supra note 193.
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persons. Because there is insufficient proof of the scope of the
false confession problem, the reliability rationale does not provide
a basis, at least yet, for barring or greatly limiting deception
during interrogation. . . . In the meantime, we should let the police
do their job of investigating crime, but we should also be alert to
the possibility of that tragic case in which an innocent person has
been wrongly convicted because of a police-induced false
confession.209

Nothing has changed, though serious issues have been raised.
However, I do have four proposals that are all part of our shared
common law legal tradition, though not all are universal. I believe they
should be universal.
First, I suggest the adoption of the Massachusetts rule. Jurors
should be more explicitly involved in assessing voluntariness.
Allowing juries to review the voluntariness of confessions will give
defendants another bite at the apple. The jury is our great bell-weather
of justice, the “conscience of the community.”210 They will serve as an
added defense against oppressive police tactics. They can only add to
reliability, not detract from it.
Second, I propose that jurors be specifically instructed to find any
statement made while in custody and during interrogation to have been
made freely and voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt before
considering it on the issue of guilt or innocence. We need to be very
explicit about this and tell the jury what to do and how to do it
correctly. We should hold the prosecution to the reasonable doubt
standard.
Third, the use of experts should be encouraged both before the
court and the jury. However, the strict requirements of Daubert v. Dow
Chemical211 or Frye v. United States,212 must be maintained for any
expert testimony. This is especially so in light of some of the dubious
science at issue in this context. So far, courts have been disinclined to
allow expert testimony for good reasons. Daubert and Frye demand
good reasons in order to qualify as expert testimony. Rigorously
209. Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is too Far?,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1209 (2001).
210. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 487 (1984); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 435 (1980); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
211. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
212. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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adhering to their requirements will make the process more reliable, not
less so.
Fourth, the traditional common law principles are up to the task.
The “totality of the circumstances” must be taken seriously. Detailed,
thorough, and in-depth fact-finding must be made by the court in the
first instance where a defendant attacks a confession. This is not new;
it has always been demanded by the common law. Judges need to
return, with renewed vigor and caution, to the kind of analysis they
should have always been doing from the start. There is good reason to
believe that many of the confession cases challenged by critics
involved confessions that may be involuntary under the due process
test.213 A rigorous and searching “totality of the circumstances” test
remains the best way to “be alert to the possibility of that tragic case in
which an innocent person has been wrongly convicted because of a
police-induced false confession.”214
The balance struck by current law is fair, reasonable, and
constitutional. There is no error free procedure. We cannot avoid
errors, but the procedures I have outlined will diminish the risk of false
confessions and preserve the delicate balance struck by the common
law. This is a balance that preserves defendants’ rights and also
recognizes the importance of police interrogation in the investigation
of crime and the protection of the public from criminals.

213. There is a concern raised by many scholars that Miranda actually makes it
easier to introduce a bad confession. Once judges and juries hear than Miranda rights
were given, they stop carefully analyzing the situation. The defendant was read his/her
rights, so they knew they did not have to talk, right? Other subtle forms of coercion or
deception are ignored and glossed over. Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?)
of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965 (2012). I do not advocate the overruling of
Miranda. That is an issue beyond the scope of this article. Miranda is still sound law,
we simply cannot stop there.
214. See Magid supra note 212.

